For ‘Physitians of the Soule’:

The Roles of ‘Flight’ and ‘Hatred of Abomination’
in Thomas Wright’s *The Passions of the Minde in Generall*

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Abstract: This article attempts to understand how Thomas Wright’s 1604 work, The Passions of the Minde in Generall, might have fitted into his overall mission as an English Catholic preacher, particularly when read via Wright’s understanding of Thomas Aquinas’s passion of fuga seu abominatio. Some historians claim that Wright was a controversialist, previously describing The Passions as either a radical departure from Wright’s mission, or the work of a different Thomas Wright. Earlier attempts to find a missionary element within The Passions have been inadequate. Through a close reading of The Passions, specifically analysing Wright’s interpretation of fuga seu abominatio within the context of Wright’s intended readership, the main message of The Passions, and his background, this article suggests a possible reading of the text as a work aimed specifically at fellow English Catholics. To Wright, the passions of hatred of abomination and flight or detestation, derived primarily from Aquinas’s fuga seu abominatio, were not simply a form of disgust, as often assumed, but the potential worldly or otherworldly harm that someone we love, such as a neighbour, might face from the abominable evil of sin and damnation. By linking hatred of abomination, flight or detestation, and Wright’s particular view of sin together, Wright was teaching English Catholics how these passions might be used to cure diseased souls, turning the work into a guide for preaching.
In 1595, an English Catholic priest, Thomas Wright, picked a fight with Matthew Hutton, the new Archbishop of York. Wright believed that it was acceptable for a subject to kill his Monarch in the event of tyranny; the Archbishop disagreed. Earlier that year, Wright had returned to England after twenty years of exile. He had openly presented himself to Anthony Bacon, secretary to Queen Elizabeth’s treasurer and her one-time favourite, Robert Devereux, the Second Earl of Essex. Before returning home, Wright had upset, and then resigned from, the Jesuit order, and had come to realise that his loyalties lay with England. Wright struck a deal: he could be confident of his freedom in return for intelligence on King Phillip of Spain. Unfortunately for Wright, the protection that this deal afforded him was not enough to keep him out of prison after a confrontation with the Church’s second most senior Archbishop. He found himself under arrest within a year, and his situation worsened when he published a highly controversial work, *The Disposition or Garnishmente of the Soule* (henceforth referred to as *Disposition*), promoting Catholicism.¹ Not only did this work call Wright’s reputation into question, it was also used to attack Essex and another of Wright’s circle, Henry Wriothesley, the Third Earl of Southampton. The chief prosecutor at the inevitable trial of Essex and Southampton was Anthony Bacon’s famous brother, Sir Francis Bacon, and Wright acted as a witness for the prosecution. Although Southampton claimed to have met Wright only once, he was imprisoned as a traitor until 1603. He could, nevertheless, take comfort from retaining his head, unlike Essex, who lost his in 1601.²

With the exception of one publication, Wright appears to have been a troublemaker. Historian Thomas O. Sloan describes him as a ‘controversialist’ whose work and deeds were suffused ‘with a clear, doctrinaire, religious stance’.³ The exception to this is believed to be his most famous publication, 1601’s *The Passions of the Minde*, and more particularly the extended version published in 1604, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (the latter is the focus of this paper and hereafter
referred to as *The Passions*). This seems odd. If Wright was a controversialist, it is surely more likely that *The Passions* was in some way a part of Wright’s missionary activities, rather than some radical departure. However, many of the assumptions of Wright’s controversial nature were the result of his attempt to be both a good Catholic and a loyal Englishman, and his belief that the two were not mutually exclusive.

This article has two goals. The first is to try to comprehend how Wright described Thomas Aquinas’s attempts to understand the nameless passion that lies opposite to desire that Aquinas described as *fuga seu abominatio*. Wright’s take on this passion will be unpicked in the second half, beginning with an exploration of Wright’s view on the passions as a set of three binaries: those that tend towards an absolute, future or present good or evil. It will then explore how Wright developed Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas’s single *fuga seu abominatio* as two related passions — ‘flight or detestation’ and ‘hatred of abomination’ — within this framework. These passions are often mistaken within modern historiography for disgust. By comparing Wright’s interpretation of them to modern notions of disgust, it is possible to develop a fuller understanding of the differences between them, and so better understand *fuga seu abominatio*’s role in *The Passions*. This is not to suggest that Wright’s was the only interpretation of the passion in existence at the time, however, it is likely that those within his intended English Catholic readership would have recognised the passion as Wright described it.

The second and primary goal is to use Wright’s interpretation of *fuga seu abominatio* in the context of a close reading of *The Passions*. This will highlight aspects of the work, and elements of a particularly relevant earlier work by Wright that caused him to be imprisoned, *The Disposition*, to suggest that *The Passions* was part of Wright’s missionary activities. This is best understood through a criticism of how some historians have previously explained *The Passions*’ central medico-theological
message of the cure and control of unruly or inordinate passions and how they were to be used to influence the actions of others. When placed alongside an examination of Wright’s understanding of *fuga seu abominatio*, it reveals *The Passions*, at least in part, as a guide to conversion for English Catholics. This thread will run throughout the paper and into the conclusion. It will start with a discussion of interpretations of Wright’s life as that of a troublemaker, suggesting that he was more likely someone trying to balance Catholicism and loyalty to his native England. This loyalty would have included attempting to turn the English nation he loved away from a Protestantism he reviled.

**A CONTROVERSIALIST?**

Wright was born to a Catholic family in York in 1561, but fled to the continent at sixteen years of age during a period of increased hostility against Catholics. Desiring to become a missionary, Wright attended the Douai Seminary, followed by the English College in Rome. In 1580, he joined the Society of Jesus and in 1586 became a priest. Another more senior English Catholic, Father Robert Parsons, recognised Wright’s talent for debating and channelled the young priest’s energies into the teaching of apologetics against heretics at the Valladolid Seminary. This ploy did not achieve a great deal of success: Wright soon focused his rhetoric on his own Jesuit order, disagreeing with their support for a Spanish invasion of England. Instead, he suggested that by submitting to the English Crown, an era of tolerance might begin, believing that Elizabeth’s successor would be a Catholic and the troubles would be over. This quarrel caused friction between Wright and the influential Allen-Parsons party, and particularly his old mentor, Robert Parsons. Parsons not only supported a Catholic invasion, but went as far as to support, if not plan, the assassination of Queen Elizabeth and the placing of Mary Queen of Scots on the throne prior to any full scale Catholic mission in England. Eventually, this
rift forced Wright to leave the order and return to England to work as a missionary somewhat independently of Robert Parson’s English Mission of the Society of Jesus. After upsetting the Archbishop of York and finding himself in prison, Wright continued to court controversy. Rather than remaining quiet, he seems to have passed his time preaching to other inmates. He is almost certainly the Thomas Wright that converted Schismatic Thomas Kemys in 1599, and it seems likely that he is the man responsible for the conversion of playwright Ben Jonson. Jonson, Wright, and another English Catholic, Hugh Holland, contributed dedicatory poems to each other’s work.9

Wright continued to cause trouble within English Catholicism after his return home. Wright was desperate for more tolerance of Catholicism in England; a possibility all but scuppered by the Gunpowder Plot in 1605. The crown appointed Wright as an assistant in the questioning of Guy Fawkes, but he failed to attend the interrogation. He then suggested that it was acceptable for Catholics to hear a Church of England sermon – perhaps because some moral guidance was better than none – provided that any Catholics in attendance did not participate in the service. In a letter to Robert Parsons, Father Robert Jones stated that of all the English heresies ‘the most bitter and intolerable, and most dangerous, is the doctrine of Thomas Wright’. He called those who followed him ‘Sermonists’.10 Another Catholic, Father Robert North, also wrote to Parsons warning that ‘whole counties and shires run headlong without struggle into the heretics’ churches at the behest of false prophets or wolves; whose leader is Thomas Wright.’ 11 Although this makes Wright appear to be controversial, sermon and ritual were a central part of his faith.12 For Wright, being a Jesuit, even an ex-Jesuit, would have meant that care for the immortal souls of his flock would have been important, even if it meant attending the occasional protestant service. To some extent, The Passions was part of this mission to care for people’s souls, without the bloodshed of war or treason.
THE MINDE IN GENERALL

If Wright’s history of The Passions is taken literally — which is probably unwise — it is a wonder that The Passions had any readership at all. Wright included an extraordinary tale regarding the origins of the work in his ‘Epistle Dedicatory’.

A treatise hereupon I penned [...] it suffered shipwrack with the rest of my writings: and at what time I supposed it had bin lying rotting in the bottome of the sea, a favourable gale brought it ashoare [...] When I beheld it, I wondered, and could not tell whether to reioyce to see mine infant revived, or feare wether it had been maimed and corrupted [...] After the whole impressions was dispersed, the Printer made meanes to have me adde what I thought wanting.13

It seems unlikely that this tale was an accurate portrayal of events. One possible explanation was that Wright was using the familiar trope of the unruly passions as a storm-tossed sea to refer to his dissatisfaction with the original work. Katherine Rowe has provided another possible explanation. Rowe has pointed out that the image of a shipwreck and the storm-tossed sea was not an uncommon trope at the time, and it often had deeper religious and political meanings.14 Wright himself described uncontrolled passions as ‘tempests & waues on the Ocean sea’ that were an ‘impediment to virtue’, that is, ‘stratagems and deceits the Deuill vseth to draw vs from God’.15 Perhaps his works lay at the bottom of the sea, beyond reach, because he believed that it was too controversial to publish them openly in England? This suggests that Wright considered The Passions of the Minde as provocative as any of his other works.

That another English Catholic, Valentine Simmes, printed both versions of The Passions seems to have gone unnoticed in previous analyses. Simmes was regularly in trouble for printing ‘popish’ works, eventually losing his licence as a master printer.16 His involvement in Robert Parsons’ Catholic English secret press seems likely. English Catholics were undoubtedly the most prevalent readers of Simmes’s
publications, and there is no reason to think that The Passions’ intended readership was any different. Simmes may have believed that the original Passions of the Minde was safe to print as it was, so he ‘brought it ashoare’, printing it relatively openly as ‘V.S’. There is nothing to suggest that Simmes published it without Wright’s consent other than in the above quote, and there is no mention or record of a manuscript version of the text having been in circulation. Taken together, this suggests that Wright’s story might have been a metaphor, and that he worried that the original Passions of the Minde might be controversial; a ‘shipwrack […] at the bottome of the sea’. In short, Valentine Simmes, a known printer of Catholic illicit materials and a likely member of the Catholic English secret press decided to publish the work, and rather than it being ‘maimed and corrupted’, its controversial nature was missed, allowing for the subsequent extended version. This conjecture may well be difficult to support, but it does fit the scenario better than taking his unusual anecdote as an accurate portrayal of the book’s origins, especially when the contents of the work are taken into account.

The central argument of The Passions was one of control and cure of the disease of the unruly passions. On page two, Wright listed the various types of people who he imagined would make up his readership: ‘the Diuine, the Philosopher, the curers of body and soule, I meane the Preacher & Physitian, the good Christian that attendeth mortification, & the prudent ciuill Gentleman’. These are all people for whom control of the passions would be necessary. Susan James has described the work as part of a ‘genre of works which offer to teach “the art to know men”, construed as including the art to know oneself’. This existed alongside works aimed at a ‘predominantly male élite who occupy, or will occupy, positions of power […] to identify the acquisition of self-knowledge with the ability to master and manipulate passions, and to associate both with a process of cure’. This is certainly the case with Wright, as he continually invoked the Socratic motto
of ‘know thyself’ for the curing of unruly, or inordinate, passions. Wright also includes ‘the curers of body and soule, I meane the Preacher & Physitian’ within his intended readership. Like many of his contemporaries, he saw the inordinate passions as a cause of disease in both body and soul. Wright claimed that ‘Passions ingender Humours, and humours breed Passions’. The result of this cross-contamination is that ‘the Passions cause many maladies, & wellnigh all are increased by thē[m]’. In a section added to The Passions, but not found in the original 1601 edition, Wright discussed ‘disquietnesse of the mind’, examining the ways that inordinate passions ‘trouble the peaceable state of this Common-weale of our soul…by Contradiction, by Contrietie, by Insatiabilitie, By Importunitie’, and ‘by Impossibilitie’. Each of these could harm not only the body but also the soul, potentially ‘forcing the soule to lie there like a beast, which should haue soared in the heauens like an angel’. This is an example of the close relationship between medicine and theology within Wright’s work. Inordinate passions could harm as easily as any disease, and worse, they could drag your soul into hell.

Thomas Sloan read the text as a theological work aimed primarily at divines and preachers, modernising Aristotelian rhetoric while promoting the type of inward meditation popularised by St. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits. It is true that Wright discussed meditation at the end of the work, and that meditation almost certainly remained central to Wright’s spiritual oblation even after his departure from the Jesuit order. However, meditation was not a primary focus of the rest of the work, or even the majority of the final section. Passages in book six did include meditative sentiments such as ‘in my prayer, fire is kindled, because meditation bloweth the coals of consideration, whereunto followeth the flame of love & affection’. However, this part of The Passions is not only about meditation, but also medico-theological errors. Wright’s description of one of these errors is particularly telling. In book six of The Passions, Wright suggested that ‘our
soules without [...] the sacraments of Christ’s Church’, were, ‘not unlike a dead body [...] infected with vices, and stinking with sinnes’. Those who do not receive the sacrament of the church were ‘not unlike sicke men, which know where medicines lie but will not seek for them, or receive them’. The Sacraments were important to Wright’s medico-theological outlook. In an earlier work published by the English Catholic secret press, *The Disposition*, Wright had laid out the process by which a good Catholic could become worthy of the Sacraments. This is not a meditation but a series of steps necessary for the control and curing of the soul for God. This is more than simple meditation and is closer to Sorana Corneanu’s regimen of the mind, where inner meditations and outward actions provided care for sick souls.

Wright’s requirement to control the passions in order to avoid medical harm to both body and soul is also central to Corneanu’s reading of *The Passions*. For her, ‘physicians of the soul’ were part of a wider tradition of the ‘regimen of the mind’. For Corneanu, ‘The physician of the soul stands at the crossroads of practical divinity, medicine, moral philosophy, and rhetoric and uses the analytical tools of theology and natural philosophy. His object is the human embodied mind and the cure of its perturbations’. To her, *The Passions* was part of a tradition of attempting to find ways to reclaim our prelapsarian mental clarity, and circumvent the intellectual limits placed upon the mind at the Fall. It was a regimen of the mind that she describes as ‘cultura anima’, that is, ‘to offer “medicine” or “Physick”, or else to prescribe the best “culture” for a mind described as “diseased” or “distempered” or “perturbed”’. Here, cultura anima has an ‘anthropological-therapeutic core’, understanding human limitations, and particularly those of the mind, and attempting to find ways around these limitations through the therapeutic practice of philosophically ordered spiritual exercises.
At face value, Corneanu’s ‘cultura anima’ sums up Wright’s intentions in The Passions near-perfectly. To understand the work as a series of analyses and exercises aimed at the therapeutic control of the passions for the cure of a disordered mind is a good description of Wright’s overall intention. Also, her further use of the notion of persona — ‘an exemplary identity wrought by the intellectual, moral and even corporeal disciplines, one that represented an office (sometimes a noninstitutionalized one) in specific cultural spaces’ — has some weight. However, her suggestion that it was part of ‘philosophy-as-a-way-of-life’, akin to Pierre Hadot’s conception of spiritual exercises, is only partly right. What she describes as the ‘prescription of remedies’ for the mind in book three of The Passions, and particularly the ‘exploration of the defects and imperfections of the understanding’ in book six, do draw upon philosophical traditions. However, Wright was not trying ‘to make the theological and philosophical traditions compatible with each other’, as Corneanu has suggested. These philosophical traditions were already part of his Catholicism. Rather than being an anthropological-therapeutic work based around personal philosophical spiritual exercises, The Passions was a medico-theological text. It prescribed a cure not to individuals, but to a particular group — English Protestants — while reminding English Catholics of the duties of their persona as physicians of the soul, and guiding them with the administering of medicine.

John Staines described Wright’s work as a guide to controlling the passions of others through rhetoric, in order to bring about moderation in political discourse. Staines noticed that Wright’s work on the passions ‘stemmed from his work as a Catholic missionary, preaching in the Protestant England of Elizabeth and James and engaging in print controversies on behalf of his faith.’ He is correct. However, Wright’s discussion of rhetoric in The Passions was not just part of a call for a ‘public sphere of free religious debate’; the lines of, perhaps unintentional, equivocation it trod upon were subtler, and included both a theological and medical element.
Passions was not only a call for the moderation and control of one’s own passions, but of their use in the curing of diseased souls by steering them back to the Catholic faith.

For Wright, curative control of the passions should not be a purely personal endeavour, for this would go against his polemic against self-love as the source of sin. To Wright, self-love was the cause of all inordinate passions. Wright believed that ‘an inclination, faculty, or power to consuerue it selfe, procure what is needeth, to resist and impugne whatsoeuer hinderth it of that appertaineth unto his good and conservuation’ is a law of nature that applied to all things, not just living things. For example, ‘wee see fire continually ascendeth vpward, because the coldnesse of the water, earth, and ayre much impeacheth the virtue of his heate: heauie substances descend to their centre for their preseruation’. This suggests that something akin to passions can act without the need for thought, with such inclinations existing beyond the will as part of the fabric of creation. However, God has granted humans ‘a reasonable soule, the which, like an Empresse was to gouern the body, direct the senses, guide the passions as subiects and vassals’. Unfortunately, ‘Selfe-Loue vpstarts, and for the affinitie whith sense [...] wil in no case obey reason, but allured with the baite of pleasure and sensualitie, proclaimeth warres and rebellion against prudence, against the loue of God’. If we give in to self-love, the all-important prudence needed to moderate the passions breaks down and with it we lose ourselves to inordinate passions at the expense of reason, and the health of our souls. A physician of the soul should also be able to generate passions in others as a weapon against this gateway to sin in those around us.
READING THE PASSIONS

Within the work are a number of passages that further point to a particular intended readership, passages that only make sense within the rubric of late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century English Catholicism. Wright tied his divines, noblemen, and physicians of body and soul together through the figure of the ‘good Christian whose life is a warrefare vpon the earth; he who if he loue his soule, killeth it, he, whose studie principally standeth in rooting out vice, and planting of vertue’. Given his rejection of both Protestants and ‘Catholique-Lyke Protestants’ in his earlier Disposition, it is hard to see who this ‘mortified Christian’ in ‘the seruice of God’ could be other than the English Catholics most likely to read his work.

In ‘The Preface unto the Reader’ of The Passions, Wright assured his readership that the English are just as capable of grasping complex theological issues, such as salvation, as any Mediterranean and so Catholic man. In Mary Floyd-Wilson’s work, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama, she suggests that Wright was proposing that the English should ‘contravene their ”northern” excess with “southern” qualities’. For Floyd-Wilson, Wright hoped that the English could tap into a little of the manners, political awareness, and masculinity of dark-skinned southern Europeans. She claims that ‘Wright’s text is most significant […] for its explicit articulation of the notion that the most potent remedy for the northerner’s plain simplicity and rude behaviour is the adoption of a southern temperament’. This, she believes, can be found in Wright’s use of a medical understanding of the ‘inconstant humours and changeable complexion’ of the English. It is certainly the case that Wright described the ways in which climate, skin colour, hair colour, gender, and age could affect the passions in detail. For example: he stated that ‘the manners of the soule follow the temperature of the body’ and that the face was ‘the rhinde and leaves’ of the passions. It is also true that Wright acknowledged that English temperaments could change, likening the English to people that live in the
countryside who, after being brought to a city, are at first ‘simple, and vnwarie, but afterwards, by conversing a while, and by the experience of others mens behaviours, they become wonderful wise and iudicious.’

There is more to the difference between southern and northern Europeans in this period than the colour of skin, however. Noting the changeable complexion of the English was not only a problem of manners, masculinity and being more politically aware, it was also an indicator of the instability of English faith. The ‘simple and vnwarie’, light-skinned and effeminate Protestant north was a contrast to the ‘bold and audacious’ dark-skinned and masculine Catholic south. England had rocked back and forth between Catholicism and Protestantism over the course of the second half of the sixteenth century. Wright claimed that he desired ‘the good of my Countrie; the last end, the glory of God; whereunto all our labours must tend, and all our actions be directed; and therefore to him let these little sparkes be consecrated, to kindle the fire in his most holy Temple.’ Wright believed that the English could become more southern in their thoughts and behaviour and, as a consequence, return once more to Catholicism. *The Passions* was part of his agenda to make England Catholic. Its role in this agenda becomes clearer when Wright’s interpretation of the passions, and particularly his version of *fuga seu abomanatio*, is understood.

**THE PASSIONS OF THE MINDE**

Wright used a traditionally Aristotelian causal framework to analyse the various causes of the passions: firstly, the efficient causes or external influences; secondly, the material causes or the internal motions that are responsible; thirdly, the formal cause or the appearance or shape the cause takes; lastly, the final cause or the
purpose served by the object. At the centre of this was a tripartite soul that possessed rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers. Although using the terms ‘passions’, ‘affections’, and ‘perturbations’ interchangeably, Wright acknowledged the existence of a specific type of ‘affections’, that were ‘immaterial, spiritual, [and] independent of any corporeal subject’. Wright believed in a tripartite soul drawn from Aquinas and Aristotle. This split the soul between vegetative, sensitive and rational parts. The vegetative, found in all life including plants, is an object that not only exists but also contains life and is able to reproduce. Its responses to its inclinations, though more complex than non-living things, are simple and require little motion. The sensitive soul is found in humans and animals. Its increasingly complex responses and movement to its inclinations are influenced by sensations, either external through sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell, or internally through the passions. The rational soul is found only in humans, the angels and God. This part provides speech, abstract knowledge, and control over the will. The term ‘minde’ referred to both the rational soul and the sensitive soul, as Wright believed that the passions existed across these two parts, ‘bordering vpon reason and sense’.

Wright looked to Roman physician Galen for an explanation for the material cause of the passions. According to Galen and the medical understanding of the seventeenth century, the body contained four liquid humours, each associated with different physical attributes: Sanguine or Blood was warm and moist; Choler or Yellow Bile was hot and dry; Phlegm was cold and wet; Melancholic or Black Bile was cold and dry. An imbalance or excess of any one of these humours would create a damaging concoction, contaminating the other humours and causing illness. The removing, or purging, of the excess humour was believed to be the best way to effect a cure. Galen believed that the passions could cause a similar imbalance of humours in the heart. The resultant concoctions might cause the heart to heat up, cool down, dilate, or contract, depending on the passion. This would cause harm to both the
physical body and the soul if left unchecked. Wright linked the internal feelings associated with the passions to the heart, believing it to be ‘the peculiar place where that Passions allodge’. Wright also acknowledged that it was possible to feel the effects of the passions in other parts of the body through the movement of spirits and humours. Wright believed that the passions would express themselves through the voice, mannerisms, behaviour, and the face, and as was discussed earlier, that the intensity of the passions could differ depending on gender, race, and climate.

This formal cause was an essential ingredient and particularly important to the final cause. This final cause, however, is more difficult to pin down.

One candidate for Wright’s final cause is rhetoric, although a section of *The Passions* not present in the 1601 *The Passions of the Mind* may suggest otherwise. It does seem to be the case that there was a greater focus on rhetoric in *The Passions* than in any similar book from the period, but this is not a traditionally rhetorical work. Sloan suggests that rather than splitting the book into the traditional subtopics of rhetoric, two of the subtopics — style and memory — are found throughout the work with the exception of book five. In book five, Wright covers three of the subtopics — action, invention, and arrangement. Book five is something of an anomaly. Not existing in the original 1601 *The Passions of the Mind*, it stretches from page 149 to 293 of *The Passions* and is by far the longest section of the text. Unlike the rest of the work, it is not separated into chapters, but instead reads as a single monograph with three loose themes. These are ‘How Senses moues Passions’, ‘Motiues to Loue’, and ‘Meanes or Motiues to moue Hatred, Detestation, Feare, and Ire’. The first section examines techniques to use in speech and writing: visual aids, tones of voice, and actions of the body during discussion and preaching. Much of the later sections, and particularly ‘Motiues to Loue’, read like a devotional work. They include such lines as ‘O my God, the soule of my soule, and the life of all true loue, these dry discoueries of affections […] haue long detained, & not a little distasted me’. These
sections may be Wright’s attempt to practice what he preached in the first part of book five. Book five is different enough to the rest of the work, so long, and so self-contained that it may have been intended as a separate publication. Whether this speculation is correct or not, it does make Sloan’s suggestion of a work on rhetoric somewhat at odds with the existence of the 1601 work. It is surely unlikely that the original edition was a work on rhetoric that covered only the areas of style and memory. It is more likely that Wright’s intentions were broader than simply the creation of a treatise on rhetoric.

Despite the inflated role of meditation and rhetoric within Sloan’s analysis, he does properly suggest the influence of a more contemporary way of thinking. Sloan correctly points out that Wright attempted to urge divines and orators to read *De locis theologicis* by Melchior Cano, a controversial 1563 work that ‘attempted to scientize theology’. This referred to the Augustinian notion of scientia or knowledge, as opposed to sapientia or wisdom. *The Passions* was a work of scientia, as Wright explained himself: ‘I have endeavoured first of all (as I thinke) to draw into forme and method, according to the principles of Sciences, hoping that some other will hereby take occasion to eyther perfect mine, or to attempt a better’. This ‘forme and method’ consisted of a mixture of Thomist and Aristotelian scholasticism and elements of Scotism within the context of this new science. Sloan believes that this mixture of old and new ideas could account for the missing controversy in the work, but that makes little sense. Many of Wright’s contemporaries had works in print that went some way beyond Wright in trying to modernise philosophical thinking without causing a great deal of trouble. Put next to Bacon’s 1605 work *The Advancement of Learning*, for example, *The Passions* was tame. Wright’s mixing of intellectual strands is curious, but far from unique.

Not explicitly mentioned in *The Passions*, one element was perhaps acquired through Wright’s association with Sir Francis Bacon: a Ramist-style methodology.
The Ramists sought a change in traditional scholasticism, seeking to replace it with a more schematic and ordered structure of knowledge. At the centre of this methodology was the subdivision of the universe into binary trees. *The Passions* follows a similar if not identical method, moving from the general to the particular. The inclusion of the word ‘generall’ in the title is likely to be a reference to this universal starting point. It is, however, a loose adaption of Ramist methodology; Wright was still able to incorporate and adapt Thomist and other frameworks. A good example of this approach is in Wright’s understanding of Aquinas’s fundamental passions.

Aquinas placed his passions into two groups borrowed from Plato: the ‘Concupiscible’ and the ‘Irascible’.65 The former consisted of those passions felt commonly: ‘love’ and ‘hate’, ‘desire’ and ‘aversion or abomination’, ‘pleasure’ and ‘sorrow’.66 The latter were those passions that assisted us when taking decisive action, or struggle was necessary: ‘hope’ and ‘despair’, ‘courage’ and ‘fear’, and ‘anger’.67 Wright reformulated this system using a loose Ramist-style methodology that also drew upon medieval Scottish theologian Duns Scotus’s understanding of the passions. Instead of grouping the passions as irascible and concupiscible, Wright, like Scotus, split the passions into six binary pairs that either ‘tends to good’ or ‘tends to evil’.68 The six opposites were hatred and love, fear and desire, and sadness and pleasure. Sloan sees this as nothing more than a reformatting of Thomist doctrine, but in a great departure from both Aquinas and Scotus, fear, not *fuga seu abominatio*, had become the opposite of desire. This did not mean that Wright abandoned the notions of flight and abomination, just that he understood them as kinds of hate and fear respectively. To get a basic understanding of what *fuga seu abominatio* was and was not, it is worth considering the problems with the way recent historians have interpreted this passion through psychology.
DISGUST OR ABOMINATION

Thomas Aquinas did not define the passion of *fuga seu abominatio* beyond describing it as the opposite of desire and declaring that ‘it had no name’. Unfortunately, attempts to unpack the complex passion of *fuga seu abominatio* have now all but stopped, with modern historiography and philosophy mistaking it for modern notions of disgust drawn from psychology. Psychologists often describe disgust as a ‘basic emotion’, assuming it to be universal and transhistorical. While it may be true that all cultures and times have a bodily reaction akin to disgust, a reaction is not necessarily an emotion. If this were otherwise, other bodily responses such as hunger and physical pain would have to be included in psychology’s list of basic emotions. Beyond the physical reaction, other elements of disgust that are assumed to be universal would have to be present in *fuga seu abominatio* and they are not. According to Paul Rozin, Jonathan Haidt, and Clark McCauley, core disgust consists of: the disgust or gape face, the lowering of the heart rate, the oral element or oral focus, the sense of contamination, and the revulsion to animal and human products. A neighbour’s fire, something that will be shown to be one of Wright’s triggers for his version of *fuga seu abominatio*, does not sit easily with any of these core elements. William Ian Miller is perhaps the strongest advocate for the idea that the word ‘abomination’ is synonymous with modern disgust. He suggests that it was generalised from the Middle English ‘abhominacioum’ to mean ‘loathsome, odious, or disgusting actions’ that would trigger nausea. He describes disgust, and so abomination in the medieval and early modern period, as ‘expressions declaring things or actions to be repulsive, revolting, or giving rise to reactions described as revulsion and abhorrence as well as disgust’. Even this wide description is not how *fuga seu abominatio* and its derivatives were regularly used in the late medieval and early modern periods, and was certainly not Wright’s understanding of it.
More recently, Nicholas Lombardo has translated *fuga seu abominatio* as ‘aversion (*fuga*) or repulsion (*abominatio*)’.76 He has suggested that it was the ‘passion of avoidance’, but he does not go into further detail, instead focusing on desire. 77 Aquinas, however, did not use any Latin words that would more easily translate into ‘repulsion’ in his description of this passion. Instead, Aquinas chose to use the word *abominatio* (abomination or detestation), almost certainly derived from the Latin Vulgate bible, and *fuga* (flight or aversion). The use of words deriving from ‘repulsion’, as suggested by Lombardo, would significantly alter the context of the biblical passages from which *abominatio* came. Most modern English bibles, and indeed the King James version, translate *abominatio* as either ‘detestable’, ‘abominable’ or ‘abomination’, but never as any word that could mean ‘to repulse’ and certainly not ‘disgust’.78

*Fuga seu abominatio* was the best descriptive terms Aquinas could think of for a feeling he could not quite describe. The ‘seu’ is important. Aquinas appears to have been suggesting that the passion was related to both a biblical sense of that which will offend God, and the action of avoiding or moving away from the cause of offence. Flight, or aversion, described the actions and behaviours associated with the passion, or its formal cause. Abomination described the feelings engendered by the evil object responsible for the actions of flight or aversion: its efficient cause. This passion was both a physical sensation and an action: it caused a strong internal detestation of an object alongside a need to physically avoid or to repel it. Curiously, those who tried to understand or dispute Aquinas, such as Duns Scotus, Thomas Cajetan and Ockham, also appear to have found it difficult to describe this passion beyond declaring it the opposite of desire. Most of those who tackled the problem in the seventeenth century went little further.79 Wright’s elegant way out of this problem may provide the best solution of any who wrote about the passion; he chose to both show and tell.
Continuing his mixture of a variety of traditional scholastic ideas with a loose structural methodology, Wright split many of his six main passions into two further kinds. Of interest to this reading of The Passions are the species into which he divided fear and hate. Firstly, Wright split hatred into ‘hatred of enmity’ and ‘hatred of abomination’. Hatred of enmity was a hatred caused by an evil person or object because it was an opposite, an ‘other’, that could harm the self. Hatred of abomination had two causes: ‘first, the Person beloved, and all those reasons which may stir vp his love: then the hurt of the evill, and all the harmes it bringeth with it’. Hatred of abomination was the hatred of an evil that could harm someone or something you love. It was a type of hatred caused by the love felt for another person, rather than self-love. Wright borrowed the terms ‘hatred of enmity’ and ‘hatred of abomination’ from a 1540 commentary on Aquinas by Cardinal Thomas Cajetan. According to Cajetan, hatred of abomination was not the harm that might befall a person beloved, but a hatred that caused flight away from an evil that could harm the self. Wright’s emphasis on ‘the Person beloved’, rather than the self, was almost certainly intentional; it seems unlikely that a well-educated priest like Wright would have been unaware of Cajetan’s work. To the Catholic Wright, the worst potential harm a person beloved could face would have been the ever-present possibility of eternal damnation. Wright also directly used fears of damnation in relation to these passions for the saving of souls, especially when linked to the passion of flight or detestation.

Fear was a valuable tool for Wright. In his earlier work, Disposition, he called fear ‘the beginning of wisdom [...] the first gate, by which we must enter into the palace of wisdom.’ In this treatise, Wright was describing the ways in which a good Catholic could become worthy to receive the Sacrament. In this work, fear is split into four kinds: ‘worldly’, ‘servyle’, ‘filiall, and ‘angeliacall’. The first is ‘an inordinate affection of the soule, whereby a man flieth the servuice of God’.
fear [...] consiteth in avoiding sinne, lest God would punish the offence’.87 ‘Filiall feare’ is that fear we have from being born sinners, and so being ‘an offence to God’.88 Finally, ‘angelicall feare’ is ‘a most profound reverence, humilitie, respect, & submissiō[n] vnto God’.89 Wright’s stated use of fear in the Disposition was to find those with worldly fears and leave them ‘terrified from sinne’, moving them towards hope and wisdom, or rather, Catholicism.90 In The Passions, Wright explained that fear could come in two forms relating either to imminent or distant evils. Ordinary fear was a ‘flight of a probable euill imminent: where fore two things must be proved & amplified to enforce feare: first, that the euil is great: secondly, that it is very likely to happen’.91 The second species of fear, flight or detestation, was the ‘detestation of some evill, though not imminent, nor expected, yet such an evil as we abhorre it and detest it, and possibly maybefall vs’.92 The possibility of harm found in flight or detestation, in contrast to the probability of harm found in fear, was derived from Aquinas in the standard scholarly way: by inverting a part of his description of desire. It is also important to note that according to Wright, ‘flight is detestation of some euill’: like fuga seu abominatio, flight and detestation were different names for feelings and actions associated with the same passion.93

Hatred of abomination and flight or detestation were linked, but abomination was specifically linked to hate, and flight or detestation to fear. In a section entitled ‘Means to move flight and feare’, Wright also linked hatred of abomination and flight together by their efficient causes.94

flight or detestation [...] are stirred vp with the same motives [...] [as] hatred of abomination, for as all the reasons apportable to render the inducements, which persuade the object of hatred to be abominable, all the same cause it to be detestable.95

Wright also linked these two passions through a shared material cause. According to Wright, all the passions elicited by evil ‘obiects absent’, or things that had the potential to harm, were found in the heart alone.96 This material cause was a
particular concoction: ‘much melancholy blood about the heart, which collection extinguisheth the good spirits, or at least dilluteth them’. The infiltration of melancholy into the blood of the heart would, he claimed, make it colder and drier, and cause sensations of constriction. This would in turn lead to the face becoming ‘eyther extreme pale, or high coloured’. Both hatred of abomination and flight or detestation were related to potential harm, and so these passions shared the same material cause. In short, Wright had attempted to understand Aquinas’s *fuga seu abominatio* by suggesting that it was not one but two interrelated passions: one a kind of hatred, the other a kind of fear. These passions were experienced together when someone or something we love might be harmed. The notion of harm, however, may not be as straightforward as it seems.

For Wright there was only one abominable object: ‘sinne, and the offence of God’, hence his example of what he perceived as the worst case of this: atheism. Wright said: ‘I have a virtuous friend whom I love intierly, he converseth with Atheists, the more I love him, the more I hate Atheisme, as evill to him and therefore I abhorre it should any way befall him. I am moved to abominate it as an extreme euill’. Atheism was an extreme evil, and any step towards it was a step towards the worst kind of harm: eternal damnation. Wright certainly believed that Protestantism was a step in that direction, even if he did not link ‘atheism’ and ‘Protestantism’ in any obvious way. One indication of an implied link is present in Wright’s *Disposition*. In this he lamented over the way ‘Catholique-lyke Protestants’ attempt to ‘serue both God and the deuill, to be Christes disciple, & a faavorite of the worlde’. These were the ‘most miserable’ of people who ‘lyve in continuall, horrible, and scandalerous sinne’. This description of those who are not yet Protestant, but deny their Catholicism in all but name, is not far from his description of atheists, and his description of Protestants as those who ‘cuteth upp all good works by the rootes’ is no better. Additionally, in a section of text added to *The Passions* but not present
in the 1601 version, Wright discussed ‘apostasie from the true Faith’ in a paragraph that also covered ‘Atheistes’ and ‘heretickes’.103 It was these people, Protestants and Catholic-like protestants, who were the atheists and heretics that most needed to be ‘terrified from sinne’ for the sake of the health of their souls.104 It was by using a combination of hatred of abomination and flight or detestation that Wright thought such terror was possible.

Persuading people to become Catholic was not purely a theological argument, however, it was also the dispensing of a medical cure to dangerous disease of the soul. In order to best administer this treatment, Wright suggested that a combination of hatred of abomination and flight or detestation should be the focus of a preacher’s speech, gestures, and motions when discussing sin with sinners. To this end, Wright delivered a strikingly detailed account of the behaviours associated with hatred of abomination and flight or detestation. It appears in the section of book five which covers ways to move hate, fear and anger. Wright described the actions that can move hatred of abomination alongside flight or detestation in others, likening the behaviour associated with the fear of ‘detesting an eminent euill’ to the actions of a man whose discovers his neighbour’s house on fire.105 He suggested that only a fool would react calmly in such a situation. Sensible people are more likely to ‘runne crying into the street’, shouting ‘fire, fire, help, help, water, water […] alas, alas, we are vndone’.106 The passion being described here is not simple fear but flight or detestation. It is an evil that may befall someone or something you love: your property. What Wright said next is particularly noteworthy.

the like should a Preacher doe, who knowing his auditours wallowed in sinne, ought not with filed phrases, and mellow mouthed words tickle their ears, but with terrors and feares pierce their hearts: he should cry fire of hell, fire fire is kindled, sinne is entered into the soule […] the diuell stands readie to deuoure you, death watcheth at vnawares to strike you, hell mouth gaspeth open to swallow you down […] abandon your deceitfull pleasures, put on Christ, imitate his puritie.107
Wright went on to say that ‘time is vncternaine, the peril too certain, the punishment eternal’.\textsuperscript{108} Although Wright described ‘punishment eternal’ as ‘too certain’, it remained only a potential harm because it was curable for those who could turn their backs on self-love and earthly desires. In a passage of the \textit{Disposition} aimed specifically at Protestants, their actions were described as ‘sinnes, a steaned clothe, abominable in Godds sight, [that] deserue death and hell’.\textsuperscript{109} In the above passage from \textit{The Passions}, Wright was instructing physicians of soul how to save any ‘Person beloved’ who partook in such actions, curing them from the diseases of self-love and inordinate passions that would lead to eternal damnation. He was reminding his readership of their beloved Protestant and Catholic-like neighbours, and how they potentially might suffer for eternity. He was teaching them how to create sensations of servile fear through flight or detestation and hatred of as a medication for sin.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

There are a number of factors that need to be brought together in order to understand this reading of \textit{The Passions}: firstly, the intended readership of English Catholics; secondly, Wright’s wish to convert and spread Catholicism throughout England without bloodshed; thirdly, the element of \textit{The Passions} intended as a curative guide for controlling inordinate passions that disease the soul; and finally, the use to which Wright put the passions of hatred of abomination and flight or detestation. At face value, Wright’s description of hatred of abomination and flight or detestation appears to be not that dissimilar from any of the other attempts to understand Aquinas’s \textit{fuga seu abomanatio} in the period. The only significant difference between Wright and contemporary writers seems to be that Wright believed abomination and flight or detestation was motivated by a potential harm to others, while other writers insisted that it was a potential harm to the self.\textsuperscript{110} However, this focus on others rather than the self is important. When brought
together with the various elements surrounding Wright and The Passions, Wright’s understanding of *fuga seu abominatio* as hatred of abomination and flight or detestation becomes a mixture of passions whose ordinate, or proper, use was helping others to cure sin and in the treatment of their souls. Through these passions, English Catholics could preach their religion and cure the English nation of the diseases of the mind that caused Protestantism.

When someone you love might, rather than will, be harmed by a detestable evil you experience hatred of abomination and flight or detestation, much as you might if they become stricken with a physical disease. It was a passion associated with protection of others from worldly and otherworldly harm, and more particularly, the disease caused by self-love and inordinate passions leading them to sin. The importance of love for your neighbour, an unusual addition to hatred of abomination by Wright, gave these passions a particular use. They were to be understood by a section of his intended readership as a guide to assist them when acting as physicians for ‘sicke men’ before their ‘liuing soule[s] […] falleth away by putrifaction’ and they ‘die vpon a sudden, falling into hell’.\(^{111}\) Hatred of abomination and flight or detestation became an important part of a curative work ‘with a clear, doctrinaire, religious stance’: to cure the diseased souls of the people of his country through preaching and conversion, and the teaching of others to do the same.\(^{112}\)
Notes


gave him hope for salvation should he go to the gallows.

Foley, Record of the English Province of the Society of Jesus, IV, p. 372.

Foley, Record of the English Province of the Society of Jesus, IV, p. 284.

See Wright, Disposition, epistle dedicatory.


Wright, Passion of the Minde (1601), title page.

Wright, The Passions, epistle dedicatory.

Wright, The Passions, p. 2.


James, Passion and Action, pp. 2–3.

See, particularly, Wright, The Passions, Book 1, Chapter 1, pp. 1–7.

Wright, The Passions, p. 2.

Wright, The Passions, p. 63.

Wright, The Passions, p. 68.

Wright, The Passions, p. 346.

Wright, The Passions, p. 349.

Wright, Disposition.


Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 48.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Min, pp. 67–68.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 4.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 6.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 7.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 7.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 58.

Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind, p. 53.

John Staines, ‘Compassion in the Public Sphere of Milton and King Charles’, in Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion, ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and

39 John Staines, ‘Compassion in the Public Sphere of Milton and King Charles’, p. 95.

40 Wright, The Passions, p. 12.

41 Wright, The Passions, p. 12.

42 Wright, The Passions, p. 12.

43 Wright, The Passions, pp. 4–5.

44 Wright, Disposition.

45 Mary Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 64.

46 Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama, pp. 137–58.

47 Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama, p. 64.

48 Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama, p. 158.

49 Wright, The Passions, p. 38, p. 30; see also Book 1, Chapter 10, pp. 37–44.

50 Wright, The Passions, preface.

51 Wright, The Passions, p. 137.

52 Wright, The Passions, p. 137.

53 Wright, The Passions, p. 32.


56 Wright, The Passions, p. 32.

57 Wright, The Passions, pp. 33–34.

58 Wright, The Passions, pp. 37–44.


60 Wright, The Passions, pp. 149–293.


63 Wright, The Passions, preface.

64 Bacon was certainly aware of the Ramists. Indeed, his criticism of the rigidity of their methodology may have had an impact on Wright’s loose adoption of their methodology. See Francis Bacon, The Major Works, ed. by Brain Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 342.

65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Man (1a.75–83), ed. and trans. by Timothy Lachlan Sutor


See, for example, Alexandra Cuffel, *Gendering Disgust in Medieval Religious Polemic* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).


See, for example, Deuteronomy 17:1 ‘non immolabis Domino Deo tuo bovem et ovem in quo est macula aut quippiam vitii quia abominatio est Domini Dei tui [You shall not sacrifice unto the Lord thy God any ox or sheep wherein is a blemish, or any fault for that is detestable (or abominable) to the Lord thy God].’ See also Exodus 8:26; Leviticus 18:22, 26, 29; Deuteronomy 7:25,26; 13:31; 13:14; 17:4. Eusebius Hieronymus (St. Jerome), *Latin Vulgate Bible* (Kirkland: Latus Publishing, 2011).


Wright, *The Passions*, p. 272. ‘Odium inimicitiae’ and ‘ odio abominationis’. Cajetan’s analysis was faithful to Aquinas in most respects, but it deviated significantly in its attempt to understand Aquinas’s *fuga seu abominatio*. Thomas Cajetan, *Secunda Secundae Summae Sacrosanctae Theologiae* (Lyons: Hugonem a Porta, 1558), p. 131. Presbyterian priest, Edward Reynolds, produced a description of Hatred of Abomination almost exactly the same as Cajetan’s in 1640 that he attributed to ‘schoole-men’. Reynolds, *Treatise of the Passions*, p. 111.
Richard Firth-Godbehere, ‘For “Physitians of the Soule”’

85 Wright, Disposition, p. 31.
86 Wright, Disposition, p. 31.
87 Wright, Disposition, p. 32.
88 Wright, Disposition, p. 33.
89 Wright, Disposition, p. 36.
90 Wright, Disposition, p. 44.
91 Wright, The Passions, p. 274.
94 Wright, The Passions, p. 272.
95 Wright, The Passions, p. 273.
96 Wright, The Passions, p. 34.
97 Wright, The Passions, pp. 61–62.
98 Wright, The Passions, p. 27.
100 Wright, The Passions, p. 273.
101 Wright, Disposition, To the Catholique-Lyke Protestants.
102 Wright, Disposition, To the Protestants.
103 Wright, The Passions, p. 54. Section ends ‘and carrieth them to the deuil’ in Wright, Passions of the Minde (1604), p. 97.
104 Wright, Disposition, p. 44.
105 Wright, The Passions, p. 181.
106 Wright, The Passions, p. 182.
107 Wright, The Passions, p. 182.
108 Wright, The Passions, p. 182.
109 Wright, Disposition, To the Protestants.